jeudi, décembre 13, 2007

Vers la fin de la shareholder primacy ... peut être

Passionnant et édifiant ! Cet article de L. A. STOUT (Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford) de seulement 14 pages amène à se poser la question suivante : comment se fait-il que la stakeholder theory soit tellement peu abordée par les auteyurs nord-américains dans la définition des objectifs des entreprises cotés ?

Abstract : Among non-experts, conventional wisdom holds that corporate law requires boards of directors to maximize shareholder wealth. This common but mistaken belief is almost invariably supported by reference to the Michigan Supreme Court's 1919 opinion in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. This Essay argues that Dodge v. Ford is bad law, at least when cited for the proposition that maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper corporate purpose. As a positive matter, U.S. corporate law does not and never has imposed a legal obligation on directors to maximize shareholder wealth. From a normative perspective, options theory, team production theory, the problem of external costs, and differences in shareholder interests all suggest why a rule of shareholder wealth maximization would be bad policy and lead to inefficient results.

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