Il propose notamment de s'intéresse aux normes de conduite régissant les gestionnaires de portefeuille qui n'induisent pas les bonnes motivations à son avis.
Historically, the “buy side” (that is, those who manage savings for others) have comfortably depended on the “sell side” (the brokers and research analysts). While recent initiatives to advance corporate governance goals have been a laudable exception, the time has come for investment managers to assume a broader and more active leadership role in financial markets and beyond.Why? Because default in taking environmental, social and governance issues into account, given the increasingly obvious impacts on investments over the long term, may well constitute a failure of duties owed by investment managers to those who entrust their savings to them.
To paraphrase the old aphorism, those who live in glass houses should always answer the doorbell. While, in the face of current market failures, the temptation is to look for scapegoats and call for more accountability elsewhere, investment managers (particularly those managing long-term savings) are uniquely suited (if not obliged) to lead by example with respect to effective governance. It is for them to aggressively advance the process of developing and experimenting with models that aren't solely about rules and reporting or compliance but, rather, involve thinking more deeply about what motivates good behaviour and informed judgment. Doing so requires a longer-term view and one that brings coherence to a range of disparate systemic risks. The effects could be powerful, hopefully stimulating a much broader awareness-tipping process.
Peu d'attention a effectivement été accordée aux gestionnaires de portefeuille au cours des dernières années, même si des critiques ont été formulées périodiquement. Il sera intéressant de voir si ce commentaire suscitera des études et réflexions. Il s'agit certes d'un bon sujet pour des étudiants en quête de thème pour leur mémoire - voire thèse. À suivre.