Les pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance: Magna et Disney

Le débat sur la qualité de la gouvernance des sociétés se déplace dans l'arène judiciaire depuis quelques mois. Cette judiciarisation n'est certainement pas étrangère à l'activisme croissant des fonds de couverture (souvent américains) qui n'hésitent pas à saisir les tribunaux de leurs requêtes pour remettre en cause les décisions des administrateurs. Ces recours judiciaires ont donné lieu à des décisions intéressantes dans les affaires Algoma Steel et Goldcorp. À ces décisions s'ajoutent maintenant l'affaire Greenlight Capital Inc. v. Stronach émanant de la Cour supérieure de l'Ontario.

La décision comporte en premier lieu des passages qui méritent réflexions relativement à l'interaction entre les pratiques de gouvernance et la norme de prudence et diligence des administrateurs. En l'espèce, Greenlight reprochait notamment au conseil d'administration et au comité indépendant du conseil de ne pas avoir respecter des normes exemplaires de gouvernance ou les pratiques de gouvernance de la société elle-même dans son examen des opérations entre parties reliées.

Greenlight made extensive submissions as to the failure of the Board or the Special Committee to scrupulously comply at all times with corporate governance best practices or corporate governance policies adopted by MID. There was evidence of a number of instances where matters were not processed in accordance with such practices or policies...

[...]

I accept the submissions of counsel for MID and Simonetti that Greenlight is proposing a gold standard of corporate governance and that its criticisms in this regard concentrate on form and process rather than on the substance of, or result of, any actions taken by the Board or the Special Committee.

La Cour établit une distinction entre ces pratiques et politiques de gouvernance et le devoir de prudence et diligence en suggérant que le manquement à celles-ci ne constituaient pas automatiquement une contravention à ce devoir. De fait, il demeure nécessaire d'établir l'existence d'une conduite imprudente ou négligente, laquelle pourrait découler d'un tel manquement.

The standard of review of the actions of either a board of directors or a committee of directors is as set out in s. 134 of the OBCA to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation and to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. This court is not required to do a microscopic examination of a committee or a board’s processes and proceedings. The burden is on the party alleging oppression to provide evidence of improper behaviour on the part of the board or a committee. There is no evidence before this court that the failure of the Board or the Special Committee in certain instances to comply scrupulously in all respects with such corporate governance practices or policies resulted in the directors not complying with either their duty of good faith or duty of care. As to the lack of specific reference in the proceedings of the Special Committee to the transactions being in the best interests of MID or to the reasonable expectations of shareholders, I think the law is clear that the onus is on the complainant to bring forward evidence to establish breach of the directors duty of good faith or duty of care.

En somme, ces commentaires de la Cour indiquent que les normes et pratiques de gouvernance constituent des circonstances dont on peut tenir compte pour déterminer si les administrateurs ont respecté la norme objective de prudence et diligence. Elles ne font toutefois pas partie de cette norme objective.

Dans cette perspective, l'opinion de la Cour rejoint celle de la Cour suprême du Delaware dans Disney:

Delaware law does not -- indeed, the common law cannot -- hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices .... Fiduciaries are held by the common law to a high standard in fulfilling their stewardship over the assets of others, a standard that (depending on the circumstances) may not be the same as that contemplated by ideal corporate governance ....

[T]he best practices of corporate governance include compliance with fiduciary duties. Compliance with fiduciary duties, however, is not always enough to meet or to satisfy what is expected by the best practices of corporate governance.

Le deuxième élément digne de mention dans la décision est certainement la description des tactiques des fonds de couverture pour faire pression sur les administrateurs:

The conduct of Greenlight complained of by the Respondents consists principally of surreptitiously taping phone calls with representatives of MID, filing its complaint letter to the OSC without any prior notice to MID and immediately prior to a conference call between MID representatives and analysts to discuss the Proposed Privatization, providing a copy of the complaint letter to the media and to a number of analysts and shareholders of MID prior to providing it to MID, using threats of litigation in an attempt to intimidate members of the Board and MID management, inaccurate and misleading statements made in materials forwarded by Greenlight to the shareholders of MID and making inflammatory and disparaging remarks about Stronach during MID’s annual and special shareholders’ meeting on November 4, 2005.

Les défendeurs, en l'espèce, faisaient valoir que cette conduite agressive de Greenlight devrait l'empêcher de pouvoir présenter un recours pour oppression. La Cour, bien que critique de ces agissements, rejette toutefois cette position:

All of the conduct of Greenlight outlined above is certainly not something that should be condoned by this court but the issue becomes whether such conduct of Greenlight, or its motive for bringing this application, ought to disentitle Greenlight to any remedy if this court finds that oppressive conduct is established. The authorities seem to establish the proposition that an applicant’s improper conduct is not a bar to an oppression remedy unless the improper conduct was the direct cause of the alleged oppressive conduct.

De fait, la Cour confirme ainsi la jurisprudence selon laquelle la théorie des "mains propres" ne s'applique pas au recours pour oppression.

Il y a bien d'autres éléments intéressants dans cette décision. À lire.