Les private equity firms et la gouvernance

Dans une série d'articles se retrouvant dans le Report on Business Magazine de mai 2007 et le Report on Business du 30 avril, le Globe and Mail nous offre des perspectives très intéressantes sur le phénomènes des private equity firms (sociétés de financement par capitaux propres selon l'Office de la langue française) et leur impact sur la gouvernance.

Du côté des optimistes, nous retrouvons William Mackenzie qui s'intéresse au rôle des caisses de retraite dans l'univers des private equity funds dans son texte intitulé Pension funds get their power from the vote. Il résume d'abord remarquablement bien la raison pour laquelle les caisses de retraite, telles que Teachers, sont maintenant actives en matière de privatisation. Pour MacKenzie, il s'agit d'une forme d'activisme plus efficace que celle utilisée traditionnellement par ces investisseurs institutionnels qui consistaient à tenter de remplacer l'équipe de direction:

So why are pension funds opting for privatization instead of a more intensive activism campaign to fix an underperforming portfolio company? For one, it's cheaper. Institutional investors who mount campaigns for change, for example a fight to replace the board of directors of a company, find it expensive in terms of money and time. They must convince, at their expense, other shareholders of the merits of their dissident board slate. The incumbent board of directors is in a position to defend itself using corporate funds. So the shareholder fighting for change (or dissident shareholder), pays not only all costs related to the campaign to oust the target board, but also, because they own shares, the dissident shareholder effectively pays their pro-rata share of the costs incurred by the incumbent board in defending their position. In the end, the campaigning shareholder may lose the battle.

If the activist shareholder is successful, and the new board generates value by improving corporate performance, all shareholders benefit, but the costs of effecting the change will have been borne disproportionately by the dissident shareholder. This "free ride" problem acts as a disincentive to this kind of activism. In the case of a privatization, the fund or consortium of funds share the costs and the benefits proportionately. In addition, once privatized, costs associated with being a public company disappear.

MacKenzie se réjouit du phénomène de privatisation menée par les private equity firms, surtout si ce sont les caisses de retraite qui sont les promoteurs de ceux-ci ou les moteurs des transactions essentiellement parce qu'il fait confiance aux dirigeants de ces caisses de retraite:

As long as the stewardship of pension money continues to be entrusted to strong and accountable leaders like Claude Lamoureux, chief executive officer of Teachers, the entry of pension funds as private equity investors should be beneficial to our capital markets.

L'article de MacKenzie met toutefois en relief un élément important du débat sur le rôle des private equity firms comme instrument de gouvernance, à savoir que le rôle disciplinaire des privatisations et leur capacité à créer de la valeur sont largement tributaires de l'expertise et de la compétence de ces institutions. Or, il est permis de douter que tous les private equity firms ont le jugement de Claude Lamoureux ou le talent de KKR ou Blackstone.

À cet égard, la lecture des textes de Doug Steiner et de Sinclair Stewart dans le Report on Business Magazine est à la fois éclairante et inquiétante. Le premier, dans son texte Supersize me souligne les excès en vue des opérations de privatisation réalisées grâce à un financement trop abordable:

In my 27-year investment life, I've never seen so much "smart" cash chasing after so few and historically expensive deals. New money that's eager for yield has fuelled these transactions. But once managers of that moneyhave had their fill of remarketed high-risk LBOs, you'll see a meltdown of fancy new investment products, just as we saw in 2000.

Le second, dans son article Liquid enough for you? effectue une remise en contexte du rôle des private equity firms qui doit beaucoup au célèbre article de Michael Jensen The Eclipse of the Public Corporation. Il nous rappelle que les gestionnaires de ces fonds ne sont pas tous égaux sur le plan du talent:

There are PE firms, and then there are the players. On average, the top 25% of the industry—the cream of the crop that includes heavyweights like KKR, Carlyle, TPG and Blackstone—handily beat the market. The rest of the pack, however, have performed no better than the market. When you consider how much money is flowing into private equity's coffers, and how much cash is competing for a dwindling number of targets, returns for the industry can only head in one direction: down.

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There are PE firms, and then there are the players. On average, the top 25% of the industry—the cream of the crop that includes heavyweights like KKR, Carlyle, TPG and Blackstone—handily beat the market. The rest of the pack, however, have performed no better than the market. When you consider how much money is flowing into private equity's coffers, and how much cash is competing for a dwindling number of targets, returns for the industry can only head in one direction: down.

Loin d'être une panacée, les opérations menées par les private equity firms pourraient donc avoir des effets négatifs pour les marchés financiers et l'économie en général.