samedi, octobre 03, 2009

Bilan du "Say on Pay" au Royaume-Uni

Si les discussions font rage de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique pour introduire le vote consultatif des actionnaires sur la rémunérations des dirigeants sociaux (voir le Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 qui est en discussion devant le Congrès), je vous invite à lire ce papier publié dans SSRN : F. Ferri and D. A. Maber, « Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK », June 15, 2009 (ici).

We examine the effect on CEO pay of new legislation introduced in the United Kingdom at the end of 2002 that mandates an annual, advisory shareholder vote (“say on pay”) on the executive pay report prepared by the board of directors. We find no evidence of a change in the level and growth rate of CEO pay after the adoption of say on pay. However, we document an increase in its sensitivity to poor performance. The effect is more pronounced in firms with high voting dissent but extends more generally to firms with excess CEO pay, regardless of the voting dissent, suggesting that some firms responded to threat of a negative vote by acting ahead of the annual meeting. Evidence on explicit changes to CEO pay contracts made in response to specific shareholder requests confirms a shift toward greater sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance. These findings are consistent with calls to eliminate “rewards for failure” that led to the introduction of say on pay and may be of interest to regulators and investors who are pondering the merits of say on pay in the US and other countries.

Les sceptiques sont-ils convaincus ?
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