GM et le rôle du conseil d'administration

Série d'articles intéressants publiés dans le Wall Street Journal, suivant la "démission" du chef de la direction de GM, Frederick "Fritz" Henderson.

D'une part, un article loue le conseil pour avoir joué son rôle de surveillance et de critiques à l'égard de Henderson.

Tuesday's announcement that Fritz Henderson is stepping down as chief executive of General Motors vividly demonstrates the central role that the company's board of directors is playing as the nation's largest auto maker continues its progress toward full private control.

D'autre part, un autre article Why Turning the Page on a CEO Isn't Always a Panacea replace le tout en perspective en rappelant que nous avons tendance à surestimer le rôle du chef de la direction. Cet article répond ainsi à la question, que pouvons-nous attendre du nouveau haut dirigeant de GM:

How much of a difference should investors expect when General Motors—or any company— brings in a new chief executive?

Not much.

Pourquoi en est-il ainsi? La loi de la moyenne:

The real force in corporate performance isn't the boss, but regression to the mean: Periods of good returns are likely to be followed by poor results, and vice versa. High returns attract fierce competition, hurting future profits; low returns leave the survivors with fewer rivals, leading to better results down the road.

Plus fondamentalement, le chef de la direction a une capacité limitée à infléchir les forces agissant sur l'entreprise.

Most researchers agree that a company's results are determined less by its CEO than by its industry and the economy—which, in turn, are shaped by a host of factors that most CEOs can't control, like the price of raw materials, the value of the dollar, interest rates and inflation, bursts of technological innovation and so on.

In short, good management can't solve all problems, while some problems can get solved even without good management.

Il sera donc intéressant de vérifier empiriquement cette thèse chez GM...