Étude empirique récente sur la théorie juridico-financière

Une nouvelle étude empirique sur la théorie juridico-financière préparée par Narjess Boubraki, Yvez Bozec, Claude Laurin et moi-même vient d'être publiée dans le Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. Intitulée Incorporation Law, Ownership Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from Canada [(2011) 8 JELS 358-383], notre étude examine l'impact de l'environnement juridique, en particulier la protection des droits des investisseurs, sur la concentration de l'actionnariat et la valeur des entreprises. Nos résultats indiquent qu'une faible protection des droits des actionnaires en vertu de la législation sur les sociétés (la Loi sur les compagnies) s'accompagnent d'une concentration de l'actionnariat qui a des incidences négatives sur la valeur des entreprises.

Voici le résumé:

This paper re-examines law and finance theory in the Canadian context, which is characterized by a dichotomy in the legal traditions that govern incorporation law across provinces. We specifically examine the relation between incorporation law, corporate ownership structure and firm value, taking into account the endogeneity of ownership structure. Using a sample of 181 Canadian firms between 2002 and 2005, we show that firms from Quebec mostly choose to incorporate under the federal law (CBCA), perceived as more protective of shareholders’ rights, rather than under the provincial law (QCA). Our 2SLS regressions show that Quebec firms incorporated under the QCA tend to have more concentrated ownership and, that ownership concentration is negatively related to firm value (Tobin Q). These results are in line with the previous literature which, in different pieces, has identified the positive relationship between the less stringent legal environment and ownership concentration as well as the negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. In this study, we formalize these relationships while taking into consideration the fact that firm value could also influence ownership concentration, as shown by Cho (1998). These results take on a particular importance as many researchers and organizations dedicated to the protection of investors, in Europe and in many countries around the world, have criticized the existence of ownership concentration and excess voting rights (wedge). These results thus reinforce the need of better corporate governance regulations to minimize the risks of minority shareholders expropriation.

Au regard de ces résultats, force est de constater que la réforme du droit des sociétés au Québec était certainement bienvenue.