C'est la question que pose un document de travail récent du Pr Ed Rock de l'Université de la Pennsylvanie intitulé Shareholder
Eugenics in the Public Corporation. Voici le résumé de son étude:
In
a world of active, empowered shareholders, the match between shareholders and
public corporations can potentially affect firm value. This article examines
the extent to which publicly held corporations can shape their shareholder
base. Two sorts of approaches are available: direct/recruitment strategies; and
shaping or socialization strategies. Direct/recruitment strategies through
which “good” shareholders are attracted to the firm include: going public;
targeted placement of shares; traditional investor relations; the exploitation
of clientele effects; and de-recruitment. “Shaping” or “socialization”
strategies in which shareholders of a “bad” or unknown type are transformed
into shareholders of the “good” type include: choice of domicile; choice of stock
exchange; the new “strategic” investor relations; and capital structure. For
each type of strategy, I consider the extent to which corporate and securities
law facilitates or interferes with the strategy, as well as the ways in which
it controls abuse. In paying close attention to the relationship between
shareholder base and firms, this article attempts to merge investor relations,
very broadly construed, with corporate governance.
Intéressant de réfléchir à l'existence et à la promotion de cette approche dans les sociétés cotées.
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