La Coalition canadienne pour la bonne gouvernance a divulgué récemment sa position relativement au contrôle de la rémunération des dirigeants par les actionnaires. S'inscrivant dans le contexte du débat sur l'opportunité pour les actionnaires de se prononcer annuellement sur les régimes de rémunération mis en place par les administrateurs, également appelé Say on Pay, la position de la Coalition en aura étonné plus d'un. En effet, elle a choisi de ne pas appuyer les initiatives visant la mise en oeuvre du Say on Pay:
Having considered the current state of executive compensation and its disclosure in Canada, the CCGG has decided that, at this time, it will not propose or support recommendations for regulatory change that will mandate advisory shareholder votes on compensation reports for Canadian issuers,nor will it recommend universal support for all "Say on Pay" resolutions that may be brought forward in the 2008 proxy season.
Cette prise de position a suscité des critiques, certains virulentes, des commentateurs. À titre d'exemple Madeleine Drohan chroniqueuse pour le Report on Business qui s'intéresse (maintenant) aux questions de gouvernance fustigeait en ces termes la Coalition:
The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance has done a lot of good work over the years to make companies more responsive to the people who own them. But in refusing to support say-on-pay votes, the coalition has dropped the ball.
These votes, already used in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, allow shareholders to voice their opinion on executive pay at the annual general meeting. While non-binding, these votes are the only way the owners of a corporation can collectively give a clear and unequivocal signal when they think managers are being overpaid.
Yet Canada, which so often lags other countries in matters of corporate governance, has no such mechanism. And the coalition, which represents the largest institutional investors in Canada, believes it should stay that way for now.
This is disappointing. The coalition members have considerable heft and had they thrown their collective weight behind the say-on-pay movement, it would have helped persuade legislators to get on board.
Faisant partie des sceptiques face au Say on Pay, je trouve la position de la Coalition sage. À cet égard, il est intéressant de lire le rapport préparer par Institutional Shareholders Services (maintenant RiskMetrics) intitulé What International Market Say on Pay: An Investor Perspective. D'un côté, le rapport signalait les bénéfices de cette pratique:
Institutional investors in those markets report positive impacts. The shareholder votes have strengthened dialogue with companies, tightened pay-for-performance links and reduced the likelihood of severance rewards for failure. It's true that there are market differences with the U.S., and votes on pay are not a panacea. But the experience abroad suggests that the practice can and should be transplanted to American soil.
D'autre part, il notait l'impact mitigé sur la croissance de la rémunération des dirigeants:
Despite these pay-for-performance successes, observers in all three markets – the U.K., the Netherlands and Australia – note that executive pay levels are still ratcheting upward.
De fait, hormis un cas très spectaculaire, le rapport note qu'aucun vote des actionnaires n'a rejeté les régimes proposés par la direction. Nous pouvons donc nous interroger sur la valeur de l'exercice...
