L'European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) propose -à son habitude- une conférence bien intéressante qui se déroule à Washington le 15 décembre 2011 (et pour laquelle je vais essayer de me déplacer !). Le thème en est : "Shareholder Engagement: What is 'Appropriate'?".
Résumé : Is there too much short-term activism and too little long-term shareholder engagement? In April this year, the European Commission published a Green (consultation) Paper on corporate governance. From a U.S. perspective, this paper raises concerns about shareholder participation that can be seen to contradict each other. On the one hand, institutional investors are not sufficiently engaged with the governance of their portfolio companies - a problem known as 'passivity'. On the other hand, activist investors, largely but not exclusively hedge funds, vigorously engage with the company concerning its performance, including by running proxy contests. Then the problem is said to be 'activism'. Both issues are raised in the SEC's current examination of the rules that influence shareholder participation in governance. In the following sessions, we will address both themes. Is there too much "inappropriate" short-term activism? Does activism lead to "short-termism" with managers forgoing valuable long-term projects? Is there too little long-term engagement? Does the absence of activism reinforce hyperopic managerial behaviour? Are there barriers to institutional investors' engagement, and is there a case for making it more difficult for activist shareholders to engage, say by revising the disclosure rules effectively to restrict how much stock an activist shareholder can acquire?
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